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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 The problems of criminal fiefdoms—alternatively 
governed spaces (AGSs) in which criminal organizations, 
rather than formal authorities, effectively control the 
population and act as the arbiter of internal order—have 
become a serious security issue in Latin America.  In 
several countries, criminal fiefdoms have taken shape 
against the backdrop of rampant criminality that has 
afflicted much of the region over the past two decades, 
with this phenomenon intensified by competition 
between rival transnational drug trafficking organizations 
(DTOs).  
 
 In nations as varied as Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Brazil, criminal organizations ranging 
from youth gangs to sophisticated DTOs control large 
portions of the national territory. They serve as de facto 
governments as they collect “taxes” through dues and 
extortion, demand the loyalty, or at least the 
acquiescence, of the people under their control, and 
punish those who interfere with their illicit activities. 
Such groups wage irregular warfare—defined as “a 
violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 
legitimacy and influence over the relevant 
populations”—against their competitors and 
governments.
1
 
 
 While criminal organizations like MS-13 and the First 
Capital Command (PCC) of São Paulo sometimes 
provide order and limited social services, they also 
exploit and terrorize the populace. Criminal fiefdoms 
have thus exposed the weakness of governance, showing 
that states cannot control their territory or protect their 
citizens. This is having a corrosive impact on the public 
                                                 
1
 Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept 
(JOC), September 11, 2007, pp. 1-6. 
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psyche, material conditions and is undermining 
democracy. 
 
 Addressing this problem will be a difficult and complex 
task.  The issue of criminal fiefdoms is rooted in 
structural problems—inequality, lack of opportunity, 
corruption, and above all, weak state capacity. Efforts 
must concentrate on building broad political compacts in 
support of holistic anti-crime programs and efforts to 
strengthening the state.   
 
• Within this context, there are several initiatives to 
consider, including: 
 Smarter targeting and efforts to develop tools 
necessary to sustain long-term investigations and 
successful prosecutions; 
 
 Creative policing strategies that focus on police-
civilian interaction and protection of the 
population; 
 
 Short and long-term efforts to strengthen honest 
law enforcement and judicial officials to reduce 
corruption; 
 
 Building the institutional capacity of the agencies 
and offices charged with combating and 
prosecuting organized crime; 
 
 Macro and micro-economic initiatives to broaden 
opportunity and stem the stream of recruits for 
organized crime; 
 
 Intensified U.S. efforts to deal with the demand 
side of the DTO problem and a capacity and 
willingness for innovation and experimentation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
During the Cold War, Latin America was roiled by Marxist 
insurgencies that, in the process of seeking to overthrow 
governments, carved out “liberated zones” in which 
insurgents could operate freely and extract resources from 
the population. Today, ideological violence has faded, but 
the problem of alternatively governed spaces (AGSs)—areas 
in which some groups other than the government are the de 
facto arbiter of internal order—continues to plague the 
region. A variety of criminal organizations, ranging from 
youth gangs to transnational drug-trafficking organizations 
(DTOs), have established “criminal fiefdoms” in which they 
operate with little or no interference from the authorities and 
have established a form of dominance—complete with 
“taxation,” limited social services, and often-brutal 
punishment—over the population.  This phenomenon is 
most pronounced in Central American countries like 
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, but it is also evident 
in Brazil.  Where fiefdoms exist, states are essentially 
experiencing irregular warfare, as criminal groups compete 
with established governments for control and influence over 
the civilian population.  This phenomenon has highlighted 
the weakness of many states, and is having a severely 
corrosive impact on democratic governance and the rule of 
law.   
  
This paper thus analyzes the origins, manifestations, and 
ramifications of the problem of criminal fiefdoms.  The first 
section offers an analytical framework for understanding the 
issue.  The second and third sections present case studies, 
focusing on the current situation in Guatemala and São 
Paulo, Brazil.  The fourth section discusses policy 
implications. 
 
 
4 
 
CRIME, THIRD-GENERATION GANGS, AND 
IRREGULAR WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
The problem of AGSs has always plagued Latin America. 
Since the emergence of modern Latin American states in the 
early 19
th
 century, a variety of factors—namely 
underdeveloped state capacity and deep socio-economic and 
ethnic cleavages—have left governments vulnerable to 
internal disorder and, at times, deprived them of control over 
parts of the national territory.  During the Cold War, for 
instance, the Marxist insurgencies that took hold throughout 
Latin America established “liberated zones.” In countries 
like Guatemala, El Salvador, and Colombia, these zones 
eventually came to encompass large swaths of the 
countryside.  Rebel groups used these areas as bases and 
staging grounds, and within these areas it was guerrillas—
rather than the government—that ruled.  In some cases, this 
“governance” took the form of implementing measures 
designed to win the loyalties of communities marginalized 
by government, such as building clinics and schools.  In 
other cases, guerrilla governance focused more on resource 
extraction, and involved compelling people to provide labor, 
military service, or “donations” of money and supplies.  
Those who did not show sufficient enthusiasm for the 
guerrilla cause were frequently executed as “traitors.”2 
  
Notwithstanding the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia), the problem of AGSs is not mainly a function of 
ideological conflict, but rather a by-product of the wave of 
criminal activity that has swept the region over the last 20 
years.  Since the end of the Cold War, a variety of factors 
have left the region vulnerable to crime and violence, such as 
porous borders,  extensive illegal economic flows, and 
access to guns.  Endemic corruption and weak state 
institutions are giving criminal organizations significant 
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 Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), chapters 2, 6-7. 
5 
 
leeway to operate.  Widespread poverty and social alienation 
ensure a steady supply of young recruits, and densely packed 
urban slums give them near-impenetrable havens in which to 
operate. The deportation of tens of thousands of criminals 
from the U.S. over the past 15 years has effectively 
overwhelmed law enforcement capacity in countries like 
Guatemala.
3
  
 
Across the region, an array of criminal groups—international 
drug traffickers, violent youth gangs, and organized crime 
syndicates—have thus largely replaced Marxist rebels as the 
chief purveyors of disorder. These groups have carved out 
niches in a variety of illicit activities—drug smuggling, 
human trafficking, arms dealing, kidnapping, robbery, 
extortion, and money laundering—and made insecurity a fact 
of life. Latin America regularly competes for the title of most 
violent region in the world (in terms of homicides), and its 
youth murder rate was more than twice as high as that of any 
other region in 2008. In some Central American countries, 
violence is approaching levels last seen during the civil wars 
of the 1970s and 1980s. Even where murder levels are lower, 
violence and crime have driven down economic activity, 
fostered widespread fear, and made life miserable for much 
of the population.
4
 
 
There is no single model of organized crime. Some criminal 
groups are relatively small street gangs that are involved 
mainly in petty robbery, small-scale extortion and drug 
trafficking, and the occasional murder for hire. At the other 
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 Max Manwaring, A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: 
Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central 
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PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), passim; also Vanda Felbab-Brown, 
“Tackling Transnational Crime: Adapting U.S. National Security 
Policy,” Brookings Institution, July 18, 2008. 
4
 “Latin America Tops Murder Tables,” BBC News, November 26, 2008; 
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6 
 
end of the spectrum are sophisticated, multi-tiered 
organizations that operate in several cities or even on a 
transnational basis. Gangs like the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-
13) in Central America and the First Capital Command 
(PCC) in Brazil, as well as paramilitary groups like Los 
Zetas in Mexico, have hundreds, thousands, or even tens of 
thousands of members organized into numerous cells and 
overseen by a centralized hierarchy. They employ 
individuals ranging from hit men to accountants and lawyers, 
who occupy key nodes in illicit networks. With different 
divisions and sub-divisions responsible for specific activities 
some criminal groups actually resemble corporations. 
 
Some analysts refer to these groups as “third-generation 
gangs,” because they represent the highest evolution of 
organized crime in Latin America.
5
 These gangs use a 
mixture of violence and corruption to neutralize governments 
and protect their business; they employ a variety of 
weapons—heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, 
improvised explosive devices, sniper rifles, and crude 
armored vehicles—and strike with astounding brazenness 
and savagery.  What the gangs are doing, in essence, is 
seeking to intimidate the state and the citizenry into 
submission and win a free hand in pursuing lucrative illicit 
business dealings.
6
 In addition to violence, corruption plays 
an integral role in undermining state institutions. Criminals 
have long used the formula of plata o plomo (money or lead) 
to corrupt government officials; third-generation gangs have 
become masters of this strategy.  Confronted with the choice 
of an easy payout or a violent death, law enforcement 
frequently opts for the former. Gangs are thus not just 
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 John P. Sullivan, “Transnational Gangs: The Impact of Third 
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battering the state from without; they are also weakening it 
from within.
7
   
 
Across the region, gangs like the PCC, MS-13, and the Zetas 
have taken this approach to the logical next step, using 
violence to carve out geographic areas where government is 
essentially powerless to intervene.  In areas of Mexico, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Brazil, gang violence has 
become so intense and gang influence so pervasive that 
authorities have largely retreated. Gangs use these areas as 
free zones for drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human 
trafficking, and other illegal activities, and exert their own 
form of governance.  They lay down a code of conduct, 
specifying which activities are allowed. Those who comply 
with this code are generally rewarded with protection as well 
as limited social services like food, toys, and clothing—the 
allure of which is not to be underestimated in impoverished 
areas where the population has long been slighted by the 
state.  Those who do not comply are punished/ killed.
8
  
 
From an analytical perspective, it is clear that many Latin 
American countries are beset by irregular warfare. The 2007 
Joint Operating Concept defines irregular warfare (IW) as “a 
violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 
legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.”  IW 
favors “indirect and asymmetric approaches,” and frequently 
involves groups—transnational criminal enterprises, 
insurgents, terrorists—who use innovative, unconventional 
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tactics to overwhelm a stronger foe.  As a result, IW resides 
in the “grey area” between accepted typologies of conflict. It 
is a “complex, „messy‟ and ambiguous social phenomenon 
that does not lend itself to clean, neat, concise, or precise 
definition.” While some analysts might object to the use of 
military vocabulary to describe criminal activity, this 
description—with all the nuance and even ambiguity that it 
implies—accurately describes the regional security 
challenges posed by AGSs .
9
 
 
Because of this complexity, IW can be very difficult. It 
requires the threatened government to synchronize police 
and military programs, and to combine security initiatives 
with a variety of additional projects—intelligence, social 
reform, institution-building, and economic development, 
etc.—aimed at ameliorating the conditions that allow 
criminals to thrive. Given that the armed forces have 
historically been used against the citizenry, there is often 
strong resistance to involving the military in domestic 
security matters, even when the police are clearly 
overwhelmed. Criminal insurgency in AGSs thus poses a 
severe test for regional governments, with fledgling 
democracies struggling to formulate an adequate response.  
The remainder of this paper examines four such cases:  
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, and the role played 
by the PCC in São Paulo, Brazil. 
 
GANGS, DTOS, AND THE CRISIS IN GUATEMALA 
Guatemala has suffered a wave of violent crime during the 
last two decades, and has been continually plagued by 
corruption, institutional debility, and inequality while 
struggling with drug trafficking and the legacy of a brutal 
three-decade civil war.  Murder levels skyrocketed over the 
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 Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept 
(JOC), September 11, 2007, pp. 1-6. 
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past decade, reaching 108 per 100,000 inhabitants (compared 
to a world average of less than 9 per 100,000).
10
   
 
The problem of AGSs is manifest in two distinct types of 
geographical areas in Guatemala—marginal urban barrios 
afflicted by a heavy gang presence, and outlying areas where 
a government presence is weak and drug-trafficking 
pervasive.  With respect to the former, the gang problem in 
Guatemala had its origins in the civil war, as displaced and 
uneducated—but often well-armed—young people turned to 
crime. This phenomenon subsequently received a major 
boost from destabilizing refugee flows, particularly the 
deportation of Guatemalan émigrés-turned-gang members 
from Southern California in the U.S.    
 
Gangs like MS-13 and 18
th
 Street (M-18) are at the center of 
the crime epidemic.  Smaller gangs (pandillas) focus on 
petty extortion, robbery, small-scale drug trafficking, and, 
occasionally, kidnapping and murder. Larger, transnational 
gangs (maras) use international connections to participate in 
arms smuggling, human trafficking, large-scale auto theft, 
racketeering, and other organized crimes.
11
  Gangs are 
intensely territorial; they seek to control swaths of urban 
territory to maximize profits from drug distribution and 
collect “taxes” in the form of extortion from local business 
owners and residents.  In the case of the pandillas, areas may 
be as small as a couple of square blocks; in the case of the 
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maras, entire neighborhoods are at stake.  To achieve 
dominance, gangs use a blend of tactics.  They offer money, 
food, and other goods to residents who accept their rule, 
providing a social safety net that has long been absent in 
Guatemala.  Gangs also offer an alternative to relying on a 
corrupt, ineffective police force, and provide protection for 
members and  citizens who accept their rule, and intervene—
albeit brutally and summarily—in disputes between residents 
of their fiefdoms.  In effect, those who show loyalty to the 
predominant gang can avail themselves of services that the 
Guatemalan government has long failed to provide.
12
 Yet it 
would be a mistake to glamorize the role the gangs play in 
providing order, because they rely heavily on violence and 
terror.  El Flaco, a member of MS-13, explains the ruthless 
methods by which the gang extorts money and eliminates 
resistance to its power:  “We have a saying: If you don‟t pay, 
we won‟t hurt the father; sadly, it‟s the children who‟ll 
pay…We send them a letter…We ask for $5,000 to $13,000, 
depending on the kind of business he‟s in. If he doesn‟t pay, 
we kidnap his wife or a child, and we kill them.  Then we 
send him body parts showing him we mean business, and we 
keep kidnapping family members until he pays.”13 
 
As gang competition has intensified, they frequently seek to 
shock the population into submission. One detailed study 
(2004) reports that, “initiation into the 18th Street Gang 
required the rape, disfiguration, and murder of a young 
woman.”14   The way gangs use violence to cement their 
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 Author‟s Interview with USAID Official, 24 November 2009; Diana 
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control of a given territory is evident in another favored 
tactic—attacking the heavily used bus systems in Guatemala 
City and other urban centers. The gang that dominates a 
certain bus route normally charges around $13 per day for 
the right to transit the zone unmolested; drivers who refuse 
to pay are murdered. In addition, gangs occasionally conduct 
widespread, simultaneous attacks on transportation 
infrastructure. In 2008, 255 bus drivers and their assistants 
were murdered across the nation.
15
 
 
These tactics have had an immense impact in a country 
where the government is widely seen as corrupt, 
incompetent, or some combination of the two.  The police 
are undermanned and underfunded, compounding the issue 
of corruption and allowing the gangs to establish virtual free 
zones in numerous barrios.  One of these barrios—El 
Gallito—is located only a couple of miles from the 
presidential palace in the capital.  As of 2008, local gang 
leaders have dominated El Gallito.
16
  This problem is even 
worse in the rural areas, where competition between rival 
DTOs has intensified as Guatemala has assumed an 
expanded role in the inter-American drug trade.  During the 
1980s, Colombian cartels dominated the drug trade, often 
cooperating with corrupt military officials to move cocaine, 
marijuana, and heroin shipments northward. After these 
organizations—particularly the Cali and Medellín cartels—
were dismantled in the early 1990s, Mexico‟s Sinaloa cartel 
stepped in.  Since 2005, Los Zetas have begun to assert their 
own claim over the Guatemalan drug trade. The Zetas are 
moving south to extend greater control over their supply 
network, and to find sanctuary at a time when the Mexican 
government has launched an all-out offensive against DTOs. 
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According to one official in the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), the Zetas are seeking to “reach out 
into Guatemala, extend their operation into Guatemala, and 
take over the Guatemala corridor.”17 
 
For drug traffickers, as for youth gangs, controlling areas 
where organizations can operate free from government 
interference is a crucial operational imperative.  In recent 
years, these efforts have focused on a number of outlying 
areas, especially those—such as Huehuetenango and Petén—
with frontage on the Mexican border.  Dense vegetation and 
a limited government presence impedes effective 
surveillance of these areas, and groups like the Zetas, 
Sinaloa, and local drug traffickers have all sought to 
construct bases of operations in these regions.  Traffickers 
have been particularly active in constructing clandestine 
runways—crude airstrips where cocaine and other drugs are 
flown in from Colombia and subsequently broken into 
smaller shipments to be sent across the border—to the point 
that, as of several years ago, there were nearly 500 such 
airstrips in Guatemala.
18
  In rural areas, traffickers are 
accumulating private property.  Ranches and farms are 
sought as safe havens from the police (or competitors) and as 
depots where drugs and arms can be stored.  In most cases, 
traffickers seek to purchase properties initially, but if 
resistance is met, they resort to intimidation or force.
19
  
 
DTOs consolidate their influence in these zones through the 
usual mix of corruption and violence.  Local and 
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departmental officials who decline to tolerate (or participate 
in) trafficking have been murdered, often in brutal fashion. 
DTO operatives are also believed to have been behind a 
recent assassination attempt against the governor of Petén.
20
 
According to the U.S. State Department, “money from the 
drug trade has woven itself into the fiber of Guatemalan law 
enforcement and justice institutions.”21 The cartels pay 
small-town mayors for the right to set up clandestine 
airstrips, and bribe judges, police commanders, military 
officials, and border guards to avoid government 
surveillance or prosecution.
22
 It is estimated that up to 40 
percent of Guatemalan territory is either contested or 
effectively beyond the control of the government.
23
 In the 
case of corruption and violence, each has intensified due to 
competition between the Zetas and their rivals.  The Zetas, 
initially formed by Mexican special-forces deserters, have 
advanced training in intelligence, counter-insurgency, 
complex assaults, and other techniques.  As of mid-2009, the 
group had an estimated 300-400 operatives in Guatemala.  
The group has established training camps, arms depots, and 
drug caches in regions that border Mexico, and Guatemalan 
officials estimate that the Zetas have a presence in 75 percent 
of the country.
24
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The Zetas ruthlessly target their competitors as well as 
officials thought to support rival DTOs.  In March 2008, a 
firefight in Zacapa between the Zetas and Guatemalan 
traffickers claimed 11 lives. In late 2008, another shootout 
involving the Zetas, this time in Huehuetenango, left 17 
dead.  According to press reports, the fighting was so intense 
that police and military units had to wait for the combatants 
to exhaust themselves before moving in.
25
 The government 
simply cannot compete with well-armed, well-funded DTOs.  
Guatemala has a single, national police force (the National 
Civil Police), and its outposts in rural areas are too often 
small, isolated, and undermanned.  Police side arms (many 
of which are reportedly defective) are no match for 
fragmentation grenades, automatic weapons, armor-piercing 
ammunition, and rocket launchers. 
 
AGSs are having a devastating effect on the national psyche.  
According to a study conducted by USAID, “86 percent of 
Guatemalans surveyed feel that the level of insecurity facing 
Guatemala presents a threat to the future well-being of the 
country, and 45 percent feel that insecurity poses a threat to 
their own personal security.”26  According to 
Latinobarómetro, only 8 percent of Guatemalans think that 
democracy works better in their country than in the rest of 
Latin America, the lowest figure in the region.
27
  Insecurity 
is giving voice to authoritarian sentiments. According to a 
2004 USAID study, “Guatemalans cite crime, along with 
corruption, as one of their top concerns and high levels of 
crime [are] cited as the top justification for a military coup.”  
Such sentiments are evident in the explosion of private 
                                                 
25
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security personnel employed in Guatemala, as well as the 
upsurge in vigilante violence against suspected criminals.  
Both of these trends have provided affluent Guatemalans 
with some measure of security, but they have also 
underscored the fact that the state has lost its monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force.
28
  
 
It is not simply Guatemalans that will suffer the 
consequences if this trend continues.  The emergence of 
AGSs, particularly those dominated by DTOs, would impede 
U.S. counter-narcotics operations in Central America and 
make the restoration of order in Mexico all the more difficult 
by providing DTOs with a cross-border sanctuary.  Just as 
troubling, the continued weakness of the Guatemalan state 
would set a terrible precedent in a region where 
representative government remains fragile, and numerous 
countries are facing the same type of threat from organized 
crime and internal violence. 
 
CRIMINAL FIEFDOMS AND CONTESTED SPACES IN 
EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS 
 
For much of the past decade, the problem of criminal 
fiefdoms in El Salvador and Honduras was primarily a 
function of gang activity.  In El Salvador, for instance, it has 
been estimated (2006-2007) that the maras controlled at least 
15 municipalities.
29
  This phenomenon is primarily to be 
found in marginal urban areas such as Soyapango, an 
extremely poor section of San Salvador.  As one reporter has 
remarked, “The slum called Soyapango… is a big step down 
from even the worst L.A. housing projects. The corrugated 
iron shacks have no running water. There are flies and rats.  
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Sewage runs through the streets.”30  For several years 
Soyapango has been the site of conflict between MS-13 and 
M-18, both of which have thousands of members.  The 
results were gang-on-gang violence, “collateral damage,” 
and the eventual division of Soyapango and its constituent 
neighborhoods into areas dominated by one gang or another.  
In 2007, one assessment reported that, “rival gangs have 
carved up this San Salvador suburb into home turfs where 
they rule through extortion, armed robbery, and homicide.”31 
 
Both MS-13 and M-18 have sought to consolidate their 
control of these neighborhoods and extract resources from 
residents.  Bus drivers are taxed if they wish to transit the 
area and killed if they refuse to pay, resulting in periodic 
stoppages of bus service in the area; and gang members 
demand that businesses pay a “war tax” to fund criminal 
operations and provide them with a steady cash flow.
32
  
There are reports that some longtime community members 
receive a measure of respect from the maras and have made 
peace with gangs.  One resident commented that, “Now there 
is a kind of truce with the community members, who have 
decided not to go to the police … perhaps because of this … 
they leave us alone.”33 The price of peace is acquiescence, 
and the gangs continue to extort money.
34
 In some cases, the 
maras have taken to using extreme violence in an attempt to 
recruit members and extract labor from residents.  In 2008, 
an eight-year old child was apparently shot in retaliation for 
refusing to join a gang.  To escape these problems—as well 
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as associated issues like the rape of young women—families 
that can afford to have taken to leaving Soyapango in search 
of a less precarious existence. According to one report, 
around 300 families fled Soyapango in 2004 alone.
35
  
Even the police find that they have immense difficulties 
operating in places like Soyapango.  While mareros are 
sometimes reluctant to murder on-duty police officers (who 
can shoot back), they have shown no hesitation in killing off-
duty officers (who usually do not carry guns).  Because 
many officers come from poor communities and live in the 
areas where they work, they face a substantial disincentive to 
undertake any type of assertive action against the gangs.  
Those who do can be “green lighted,” meaning that any gang 
member who comes upon that particular individual is 
authorized to kill him. This dynamic has deeply 
compromised police operations. According to one affidavit: 
“The gangs have become so powerful that some police 
officers do not interfere with the maras‟ criminal activities." 
Some officers will give warning to the gangs about a 
particular raid, for example. In this way, some police can 
survive in gang neighborhoods… Police officers are forced 
to decide whether they want to follow their duties as officers, 
or whether they want to protect their lives, become corrupt 
and collaborate with the gang.”36  In many cases, they opt for 
the latter. 
 
The situation is similar in a number of Honduran 
municipalities, where gangs use violence in an effort to 
reinforce control of territory or dissuade aggressive 
government countermeasures.  In 2003, for instance, 
presumed M-18 members in San Pedro Sula viciously killed 
several young women in what was apparently a response to 
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government efforts to convince the mareros to disband.
37
 A 
year later, MS-13 members in Chamalecon stopped a bus 
traveling through their territory.  They proceeded to murder 
28 passengers. The attack was aimed at underscoring the 
gang‟s power.  As Ana Arana relates, “The slaughter had 
nothing to do with the identities of the people onboard; it 
was meant as a protest and a warning against the 
government‟s crackdown on gang activities in the 
country.”38 
 
As in the case of Guatemala, the prevalence of contested 
areas and criminally-controlled AGSs have increased as 
Central America has taken on a larger part in the inter-
American drug trade.  Located between South America and 
the U.S. and characterized by dense terrain and weak 
governments, El Salvador and Honduras have become 
attractive targets for the DTOs.  Mexican traffickers have 
long had cooperative relationships with the maras, but now 
they seem to be making efforts to establish a more direct 
presence.  The Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel are rumored to 
have begun setting up bases along the Honduran coast and in 
the rugged interior.  They use these bases, as well as farms 
that they have purchased, as depots for drug shipments and 
arms caches.
39
  DTOs have also begun to set up clandestine 
airstrips and have bribed and threatened officials in order to 
carve out greater room to operate.  In one recent counter-
narcotics operation in Honduras, the State Department writes 
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that, “clandestine airstrips hidden in thick vegetation were 
discovered, and ammunition, aviation fuel, food, and lighting 
equipment were confiscated. This semi-permanent camp was 
linked to multiple recurring illegal flights and used 
international organized crime as a very important point for 
the transshipment of drugs.”40 DTOs are thus pushing deeper 
into Central America, acquiring control over strategically 
valuable territory.  
 
As they do, competition between DTOs is becoming more 
intense and problematic.  In April 2010, the massacre of nine 
people in Tegucigalpa was linked to competition between 
Mexican organizations.  “These deaths were provoked by 
territorial disputes between drug traffickers,” the 
Tegucigalpa police chief asserted.
41
  Similarly, there are 
reports that the Zetas have sought to have the Honduran 
security minister murdered, and the country‟s top 
counternarcotics official was killed in what appeared to be a 
drug-related hit in 2009.
42
. 
 
“THE STATE IS NOW THE PRISONER OF THE PCC”—
GANG GOVERNANCE IN BRAZIL 
 
The problem of AGSs is not limited to Central America and 
Mexico, but is also a problem for a country not normally 
associated with this group of nations—Brazil.  Even as 
Brazil‟s major cities have become centers of global business 
and finance, powerful criminal groups dominate Brazil‟s 
numerous slums and prisons. 
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The mega-gangs that dominate urban life in Brazil‟s major 
cities were, in most cases, born in overcrowded prisons, and 
represent a fusion of criminal expediency with the tactics and 
left-wing ideology of urban guerrilla groups that operated 
during the 1960s and 1970s.  Most originated as relatively 
small groups dedicated to protecting members in prison, and 
subsequently gained a wider following by calling for 
improved prison conditions.   As these groups became more 
powerful, they tapped into a wide array of illicit networks—
drug trafficking especially—and began to spread their 
influence beyond prison walls and into slums where state 
control was weak.  To appeal to disenchanted slum-dwellers, 
these gangs wrapped themselves in slogans touting the need 
for social justice and economic redistribution.
43
  
 
The most notorious—and most powerful—criminal 
organization is the First Capital Command (PCC), which 
operates in the state of São Paulo under the motto, “Liberty, 
Justice, and Peace.”44  The PCC is now thought to command 
the allegiance—or at least the obedience—of perhaps 90 
percent of the well over 100,000+ prisoners in that state, as 
well as tens of thousands of members beyond prison walls.  
Since its founding, the PCC has branched out considerably, 
and now plays a strong role in a variety of criminal 
enterprises—car theft, extortion, arms trafficking, 
kidnapping, and bank robbery.  As Brazil has became a 
major consumer of cocaine, the PCC has also claimed a 
leadership role in cocaine trafficking and distribution, 
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forging alliances with groups from Colombia and 
Paraguay.
45
   
 
The PCC protects its enterprises through a variety of 
activities meant to give it latitude from the oversight and 
interference of state authorities.  Aside from corrupting large 
numbers of government officials, the PCC has worked to 
create safe havens where its members are nearly immune to 
the actions of the police or other government authorities.   
This strategy was honed in the prison system, where the PCC 
established virtual states-within-a-state during the 1990s.  
The PCC laid down a strict code of conduct for its members 
and collected “taxes” in the form of mandatory dues.  As the 
PCC‟s growing numbers and reputation for ruthlessness 
made it more powerful, it began to regulate nearly all aspects 
of prison life; for example, conjugal visits, payment of debts, 
allotment of cells and bunks, and the distribution of drugs 
and contraband.  “Cleaners” ran and continue to run cell-
blocks as their own personal fiefdoms, and their permission 
is apparently still required if one inmate seeks to murder 
another in retribution for an unpaid debt or other injury.
46
 
 
PCC rule brought drawbacks and benefits for the prison 
population.  Arbitrary violence became less common, and 
the imposition of some semblance of order had a mitigating 
effect on overcrowding and unsanitary conditions.  Yet the 
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PCC regularly used violence, murdering its rivals and those 
who refused to acknowledge its supremacy.  During one riot 
in 2005, the PCC beheaded five rival gang members and 
placed their heads on pikes to be displayed before news 
cameras.
47
  As the PCC has expanded, it has steadily moved 
into the favelas that make up much of São Paulo.  This 
expansion was undertaken to give the PCC control of drug 
distribution in the growing market, and also to find new 
sources of revenue.  The impoverished favelas have proven 
fertile ground for fostering PCC influence and power.  Often 
built on the sides of hills, the favelas are characterized by 
dense urban terrain that is a nightmare for the police.  
Equally important, the slums are populated by poor residents 
who have traditionally seen little in the way of attention or 
benefits from the formal government.
48
  
 
The PCC runs São Paulo‟s favelas much as it runs the 
prisons.  “Pilots” are charged with overseeing gang activities 
in several municipalities, making them the de facto authority 
for up to several hundred thousand citizens.  The PCC 
dominates drug trafficking, armed robbery, and other 
criminal activities in these areas, and as in the prisons, it has 
laid down a code of conduct by which the residents are 
expected to follow.  Crimes committed by non-members are 
summarily punished, and victims of rape, robbery, or other 
crimes can petition PCC leaders for recourse.  Non-affiliated 
criminals are expected to coordinate their activities with the 
PCC leadership, and to offer part of the take as tribute.  To 
foster goodwill, the PCC often undertakes the exemplary 
punishment of neighborhood nuisances and throws parties or 
distributes money or food to area residents.
49
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The PCC thus functions as a crude form of government, but 
it can also be incredibly brutal in enforcing its dominance.  
PCC operatives have extorted money from local businesses 
in order to fund criminal endeavors, and they have attacked 
police stations and other symbols of government power.  For 
example, the PCC mounted 44 attacks in November and 
December 2003, and in January 2006, launched a two-day 
series of attacks against São Paulo police.  The group is also 
apparently responsible for dozens of bombings of public 
buildings, and there are reports that its members have 
contracted private security personnel to provide instruction 
in the use of advanced weapons.  In effect, the PCC is 
seeking to convince the state that it is better off allowing the 
gang to operate unhindered.
50
 Indeed, the PCC has 
demonstrated a willingness to use hostages.  In 2006, when a 
prison superintendent refused a series of escalating demands 
and sought to transfer some 765 PCC members to a new 
facility, the PCC embarked on a five-day binge of attacks 
that threw South America‟s largest city into chaos.  One 
Brazilian military analyst described the situation as “a week 
in Baghdad.” 
 
Pistols, rifles, machine guns, and hand 
grenades were used by those involved. In a 
coordinated series of attacks, carried out with 
military precision, 293 assaults took place on 
police stations, patrols, road checkpoints, 
stores, justice courts, 17 banks, and other 
establishments.  Some 215 hostages were 
taken in 80 prison riots across the states of 
São Paulo, Paraná, Mato Grosso do Sul, and 
Bahia and also in the federal capital, Brasília.  
Eighty-two public transport busses were 
burned and a metro station was attacked 
causing chaos for an estimated 6 million 
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workers in the city and the state of São Paulo.  
A total of 161 people were killed, including 
41 policemen (most of them military) and 
prison guards, 107 gang members, 9 rebelling 
prisoners, and 4 civilians ….51 
 
Although 4,000 military police were deployed, the attacks 
demonstrated that the PCC was a dominant force, and that 
order would be maintained only with PCC willingness. As 
one Brazilian security official puts it, “….the state is now the 
prisoner of the PCC.”52 
  
 The activities of the PCC have laid bare the fundamental 
weakness of the state and underscored the inequality that 
pervades Brazilian society—the rich can purchase protection 
and live in gated communities, while the poor are left to their 
fate.  If the government cannot address these problems, they 
may come to constitute a drag on the country‟s geopolitical 
ascent.  Many citizens are already asking why the 
government should devote more resources to activities 
abroad when it cannot even control its own cities, a 
sentiment echoed by presidential candidate José Serra in 
2010.
53
   
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In Guatemala, Brazil, El Salvador, and Honduras, rampant 
criminality and competition between criminal 
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organizations—particularly transnational DTOs—is 
manifesting itself in the rise of criminal fiefdoms.  In these 
spaces, official governance has largely given way to the rule 
of groups that use a mixture of inducement and brutality to 
co-opt or intimidate citizens, neutralize opponents and 
governments, and win a free hand in managing illicit 
activities.  Beyond having socio-economic consequences, 
this trend has illustrated the political shortcomings of Latin 
American states and thrown the credibility of governments 
into doubt.  
 
What might a solution to this problem look like?  While the 
issue of criminal fiefdoms is alarming in its own right, it 
cannot be divorced from the broader wave of crime that has 
swept Latin America in the past two decades, nor can it be 
separated from the social, economic, and political conditions 
that have enabled this rampant criminality. Crime in the 
region is rooted in a combination of structural influences 
including corruption, inequality, and a lack of legitimate 
opportunities for at-risk populations. Underlying all of these 
problems is the weakness of the state. The strength of 
entrenched elites has long kept tax revenues low in Latin 
America, making it difficult for governments to carry out the 
functions and provide services—law and order, decent 
education, an honest and professional bureaucracy—
normally associated with effective democratic governance. 
The lack of tax revenue has long crippled the administrative 
capacity and performance of Latin American governments.
54
 
 
Viewing the criminal fiefdom phenomenon solely from a law 
enforcement perspective provides an incomplete analysis. 
Just as experts on counter-insurgency and IW emphasize the 
need to embed the use of force in a large scheme of military 
and non-military programs, efforts to address this problem 
must therefore deal with both its symptoms and its 
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underlying causes.  This reality indicates that regional 
governments will have to overcome—or at least mitigate—a 
variety of entrenched challenges if they are to make 
meaningful progress in tackling the issue of AGSs.  A 
combination of the problems noted above has frustrated 
efforts to weaken the power of criminal organizations in 
Latin America. 
 
There are, however, examples of countries breaking free of 
these constraints and forging a holistic approach to 
strengthening governance and the rule of law.  Between 2002 
and 2010, Alvaro Uribe leveraged the disillusion of the 
Colombian electorate to forge a national compact that 
allowed him not simply to wage an offensive against the 
FARC and its allies, but also to combat corruption and 
strengthen the Colombian state.  Since 2006, Felipe Calderon 
of Mexico has sought to emulate this model, though his 
ultimate success in doing so remains to be seen.
55
  Going 
forward, the task for regional leaders will thus be to forge the 
broad political accords necessary to build tax revenues, 
strengthen the state‟s administrative capacity, combat 
corruption and socio-economic exclusion, and improve the 
capabilities of the forces of order.   
 
Within this context, there are several categories of programs 
that will be integral in any strategy to reduce the power of 
criminal organizations.  With respect to the most visible 
aspects of anti-crime initiatives—security and 
enforcement—a central imperative is to work toward smarter 
targeting that improves the quality—not the quantity—of 
arrests.  Many countries take a broad-gauge approach to 
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dealing with organized crime, focusing on so-called mano 
dura policies that seek simply to incarcerate as many 
suspected gang members as possible.
56
  A more effective 
approach would be to target leadership elements and 
operatives who provide special skills and services. Doing so 
not only entails leveraging existing intelligence 
capabilities—those of the home country and U.S. agencies—
it also means engaging with academics, gang experts, and 
former criminals who are able to map vulnerabilities in gang 
and DTO hierarchies.  As one DEA official states, “To get 
the greatest bang for your buck, you have to rely on your 
intelligence network.”57 Similarly, it will be necessary to 
help governments develop anti-money-laundering and asset 
confiscation regimes so that they can attack the finances of 
criminal organizations, as well as witness protection 
programs and other capabilities crucial to long-term 
investigations and successful prosecutions.  U.S. agencies 
have considerable experience in capacity building, and such 
efforts with several governments have yielded results.
58
  
 
A second imperative is to experiment with and refine 
creative policing techniques that can be used to break the 
grip of criminal organizations on densely populated urban 
environments.  In Central America, U.S. agencies have 
sponsored professional exchanges and other programs that 
promote community-policing strategies and other efforts 
designed to immerse the police in the population, yielding 
greater cooperation and intelligence.  In Brazil, various state 
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police agencies have adopted counter-insurgency style 
strategies in dealing with the favelas, emphasizing the need 
for police officials to live among the population and establish 
a permanent presence.
59
  The wisdom of these particular 
policies has been heavily debated, but these initiatives do 
represent the type of unconventional thinking needed to deal 
with an irregular threat like criminal fiefdoms. 
 
Aggressive policing, in turn, will be effective only if carried 
out and supported by honest, competent professionals.  
Because addressing current deficiencies in police and 
judicial institutions will be a long-term process, it makes 
sense to take a two-tiered approach. First, U.S. and Latin 
American officials should identify the pockets of 
trustworthy, courageous public servants and augment the 
capabilities of these groups, building a small core of 
professional officials.  The U.S. possesses several tools that 
can be useful in this regard: personnel exchanges with U.S. 
law enforcement agencies to promote a culture of 
professionalism, interaction with U.S. police officers familiar 
with community policing techniques, assistance in the 
training and vetting of small, elite forces that will be needed 
to carry out sensitive operations, and support for offices 
charged with monitoring official performance and 
prosecuting corrupt officials.
60
  
 
Over the long term, more thoroughgoing institutional reform 
will be necessary to improve the performance of the police, 
judiciary, and other institutions charged with upholding law 
and order. As U.S. officials and NGOs operating in 
Guatemala and elsewhere have discovered, making progress 
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on these issues requires taking a bottom-up approach to 
institutional reform—training or re-training officials, 
developing anti-gang laws, and building rational budgets and 
personnel management systems that reward good 
performance.  The key in all this is to take a building-block 
approach: start with small, basic steps that can form a 
foundation for more ambitious measures. USAID has already 
begun devoting greater resources to these tasks in Central 
America; given additional resources, it may be possible to 
improve and expand upon these initiatives.
61
 
 
Governments must also address the socio-economic 
conditions that provide a steady stream of recruits for maras, 
pandillas, and other criminal organizations. At the macro 
level, this requires implementing policies that increase 
investment and stimulate growth.  At the micro level, this 
means investing in vocational training, education, and after-
school activities that will keep teens and young adults off the 
streets and give them some hope of succeeding in a 
legitimate line of work.  A good example of this latter type 
of policy is the USAID community center initiative in 
Guatemala, which provides the resources necessary to found 
centers where young people can learn a trade, use computers, 
and socialize—but only on the condition that municipal 
governments, church groups, and private businesses furnish 
the physical space and the volunteer labor necessary to 
sustain the centers.  By operating in this manner, USAID has 
brought additional resources to bear on the gang problem and 
has helped build partnerships between government and 
important groups of citizens.
62
 
 
If the U.S. is serious about combating criminal fiefdoms, it 
must also face up to the reality that much of the money that 
funds organized crime in the region comes from U.S. drug 
consumption. Since the unveiling of Plan Colombia, the 
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increasing emphasis on combating drug-related violence 
abroad has not been matched by sustained, intensive efforts 
to deal with the demand side of the equation.  Funding for 
domestic demand restriction activities fell as a percentage of 
the U.S. counter-drug budget between 2001 and 2008, with 
the budget for anti-drug advertising falling by more than half 
under the Bush administration. Similarly, while a number of 
cities within the U.S. have begun to consider the quasi-
legalization of marijuana and other harm-reduction 
strategies, the national debate on this issue is still relatively 
impoverished. Outlining a comprehensive demand-side 
strategy is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is clear that 
the U.S. will need to devote greater resources, political will, 
and creativity to deal with this issue.
63
 
 
This list of measures should be considered suggestive rather 
than definitive or exhaustive. Combating crime, ameliorating 
social ills, and correcting institutional decay are far from 
exact sciences, and a capacity for innovation and adaptation 
will be vital in addressing these issues.  To achieve this, a 
policy “entrepreneur,” or a creative problem-solver “willing 
to experiment with new approaches, to learn from others, and 
more important, to abandon initiatives that are not bearing 
fruit,” 64 is required if the U.S. seeks to effectively deal with 
the problem of AGSs and criminal fiefdoms in Latin 
America. 
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